UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

FORTIETH YEAR

2591st MEETING: 14 JUNE 1985

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
Provisional (S/Agenda/2591)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/17227 and Add.1 and 2)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2591st MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 14 June 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Errol MAHABIR
(Trinidad and Tobago)

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2591)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operations in Cyprus (S/17227 and Add.1 and 2)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/17227 and Add.1 and 2)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Özer Koray in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

3. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 13 December 1984 to 31 May 1985 [*S/17227 and Add.1 and 2*]. Members also have before them a draft resolution contained in document S/17266, which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

4. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 565 (1985)].

5. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I call.

6. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June and to express my appreciation for the skilful manner in which you conducted the consultations on the draft resolution just adopted, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another period of six months. It is a source of great satisfaction to my Government and the people of Cyprus that the presidency of this important organ of the United Nations is in the talented hands of a distinguished representative of a very friendly country with which we share close relations both bilaterally and within the framework of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of the Commonwealth. Our congratulations go also to the President of the Council for the month of May, Mr. Kasemsri of Thailand, for the impeccable manner in which he conducted the Council's deliberations on a number of important issues.

7. I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to address them and for the decision to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, to which my Government had given its prior consent. The peace-keeping functions of

UNFICYP are made imperative by the situation prevailing in Cyprus as well as by the very delicate ongoing initiative of the Secretary-General with regard to the problem of Cyprus.

8. In this respect I should like to express our deepest appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the Cyprus problem. I wish on behalf of the Government and people of Cyprus to assure him of our full co-operation and continued support for the successful conclusion of his ongoing initiative and to reiterate on this occasion that our hopes for vindication and justice rest on the United Nations, which constitutes the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

9. A special tribute is also due to Mr. Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, for the exemplary manner in which he is pursuing his difficult mission. We commend warmly the valuable and significant contributions of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Urquhart, and of his able colleagues in the Secretariat, Mr. Feissel and Mr. Picco, for their continuous efforts to advance the cause of peace in our country.

10. My Government's deep appreciation goes also to Major-General Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and to his officers and men, for the efficient and dedicated manner in which they continue to discharge the duties entrusted to them by the Security Council. In referring to UNFICYP, I should be remiss if I were not to express our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation to all the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have enabled UNFICYP to continue rendering its indispensable peace-keeping services in Cyprus.

11. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, following the Secretary-General's appeal, has already decided to increase its voluntary contribution to UNFICYP to the sum of $500,000. This is in addition to its contribution for the maintenance of UNFICYP under paragraph 19 of the agreement concerning the status of the Force [*see S/5634, annex I*], amounting to $540,000 for the present year. In other words, the contributions of the Republic of Cyprus to UNFICYP, both voluntary and for the maintenance of the Force, will exceed the sum of $1,000,000 for 1985.

12. The Security Council meets today to consider the operations of UNFICYP and as a consequence to review developments since its last meeting on this topic [*2565th meeting*] in December 1984. I believe the members of the Council would justifiably expect an assessment of developments that have ensued since then, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General.

13. I am sure that all of us recall the cautious optimism which prevailed in the Council at its last meeting, held after three rounds of proximity talks in New York between the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktaş, under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

14. The significant developments which have taken place concerning the initiative of the Secretary-General and which led to the high-level meeting from 17 to 20 January 1985 unfortunately have not produced the widely anticipated progress, because of the completely negative attitude displayed by Mr. Denktaş throughout the high-level meeting and his premeditated plans to ruin that meeting in order to proceed with further illegal and partitionist acts. This regrettable turn of events developed notwithstanding the many efforts of the Secretary-General and the concrete compromise proposals offered by Mr. Kyprianou as a way out of the deadlock to which Mr. Denktaş deliberately led the meeting.

15. As the members of the Council recall, at the end of the third round of proximity talks, on 12 December 1984, the Secretary-General made the assessment that sufficient progress had been achieved to justify the convening of a high-level meeting and had proposed that it take place on 17 January. Both parties agreed to his proposal. The President of the Republic of Cyprus had at that time expressed cautious optimism regarding the outcome of the high-level meeting, while reiterating that he would continue to strive hard for a just and viable solution to the problem and that he would fully co-operate with the Secretary-General for the successful fruition of his endeavours.

16. Referring to the high-level meeting, the Secretary-General stated in the course of a press conference on the occasion of the conclusion of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly on 19 December 1984:

> "As you can imagine, I do not see the meeting as a mere formality. What I expect from the meeting is a constructive discussion in which the parties will present their views on my presentation. That is how I see it."

17. This crystal-clear explanatory statement by the Secretary-General concerning the nature and purpose of the high-level meeting, which was repeated both privately and publicly on other occasions as well, became necessary following certain statements by Mr. Denktaş between the conclusion of the third round of the proximity talks and the day of the high-level meeting. According to Mr. Denktaş, the high-level meeting would be a mere ceremony for the signing of the draft agreement, which would be put on the negotiating table on a "take it or leave it" basis, without any possibility of dialogue.

18. Despite the repeated assurances given by the Secretary-General and by his spokesmen, as well as by various Governments in a position to know, regarding the purpose of the high-level meeting—which coincide with the interpretation of the Greek Cypriot side, that

is, that the high-level meeting would entail constructive discussion and dialogue on the basis of the documentation that the Secretary-General presented—Mr. Denktaş came to the meeting and for four whole days insisted that nothing at all should be discussed, that the texts should be signed as they stood and that outstanding matters, such as the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, the questions of guarantees and freedom of movement and settlement and the territorial aspect, should be referred to working groups.

19. For four days intensive but futile efforts were made to salvage the high-level meeting, but Mr. Denktaş did not agree to discuss anything at all and left New York after rejecting a proposal by the Secretary-General to fix a date for a new high-level meeting and after hastening to state that none of the documents prepared in the three rounds of talks, not even the non-papers, which included the shifts in Turkish positions, were any longer valid.

20. It is obvious from what was said earlier that not only did the scenario envisage discussions, and not only did we have the repeated assurances of the Secretary-General, but the document in question bore the title "Preliminary Draft for a Joint High-Level Meeting Agreement", and, in its paragraph 6 on territory, it envisaged, *expressio verbis*, negotiations at the high-level meeting.

21. To elaborate further, in the "Preliminary Draft for a Joint High-Level Meeting Agreement" it was stressed that "territorial readjustments in addition to the areas reflected in the Turkish proposals of 5 August 1981 would be agreed at the high-level meeting" and that the extent of these readjustments and the number of refugees who would return to their homes would be defined in the agreement that would emerge from the high-level meeting. Even on the question of the working groups, paragraph 13 of the text provided that the working group or groups might be set up in light of the political decisions agreed upon at the high-level meeting, in order "to elaborate the details of the agreements involved".

22. In order to avert the deadlock which was emerging as a result of the rejection of any dialogue and the refusal of any discussion by the Turkish side, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Secretary-General himself proposed a number of ideas and formulas to overcome the impasse.

23. The last proposal of the President of the Republic of Cyprus contained again the element of reconciliation of opposite views, and its rejection served only to confirm Mr. Denktaş's bad faith and ill-intended schemes. In that proposal it was suggested that a new high-level meeting with a fixed date be convened to deal with four basic issues: the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops, the territorial issue, the fundamental freedoms and the guarantees. The proposal also suggested the immediate setting up of a working group on the constitution, to report its findings to the high-level meeting. The fairness of this last proposal is also shown by the fact that the Secretary-General, having made minor amendments to it, to which we readily agreed, submitted a proposal to the two parties.

24. Had there been the slightest trace of good faith on the part of Ankara and Mr. Denktaş, there could have been no question of arriving at a deadlock. Furthermore, they would have agreed to a second high-level meeting as set by the Secretary-General. But the Turkish side was bent on wrecking the meeting for its own sinister purpose. This explains its outright rejection without even a counter-proposal or comment on its part. Ankara and Mr. Denktaş had further divisive deeds to perform and schemes to carry out.

25. If confirmation of this duplicity were needed, the Turkish side, soon after it rejected the invitation of the Secretary-General for a new high-level meeting to take place by the end of February, announced its illegal decision to hold so-called parliamentary and presidential elections in the occupied areas, as well as a "referendum" on the so-called constitution of the illegal secessionist entity. The scenario was thus unfolded for the world to see and to admire the extent of Ankara's arrogance and double dealings.

26. It should be stressed in this respect that these new Turkish illegalities, taking place at a most delicate phase of the Cyprus problem, show, among other things, utter disregard of the Secretary-General's initiative and of his appeal to all those concerned to ensure that nothing is done in the island or elsewhere that would tend to make the search for a solution more difficult.

27. The so-called referendum and elections flagrantly violate the letter and the spirit of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, particularly Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). I quote from the latter:

> "Gravely concerned about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic . . . and the contemplated holding of a 'constitutional referendum' and 'elections', as well as by other actions or threats of actions aimed at further consolidating the purported independent State and the division of Cyprus,
>
> ". . .
>
> "2. Condemns all secessionist actions . . . declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal;
>
> "3. Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported State of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' set up by secessionist acts and calls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity".

28. On 6 May, right after the holding of the so-called referendum, the Secretary-General issued the following statement:

> "It is the position of the United Nations, as reaffirmed by the Security Council, that it recognizes no Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus. It follows that the Secretary-General cannot condone any development or action at variance with that position".

29. The so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a bogus entity, set up by Turkehy as its puppet in the occupied area. Legally, this entity has no territory of its own, except the areas occupied by the Turkish troops, the latter having uprooted the whole indigenous Greek Cypriot community constituting 82 per cent of the population in the area, and having implanted thousands of settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled. The true meaning of these expulsions of the Greek Cypriots from the occupied areas is to rob them of their ancestral homes and country through a series of abhorrent crimes which recall the very dark ages of mankind and which should not be tolerated in a civilized world community of a United Nations era.

30. Turkey's arguments that these secessionist and partitionist moves are "internal democratic processes" of the Turkish Cypriots living in the occupied areas of Cyprus receive the international scorn which they deserve. The Turkish Cypriots, being themselves under occupation, cannot freely exercise democratic processes. It is Turkey, in line with its divisive policy, that conceives and dictates these separatist acts against the territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus.

31. The Turkish argument, on the other hand, that the Turkish Cypriot community in the area can exercise separately the right to self-determination, is untenable. First, it distorts the principle of self-determination embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which is to be exercised by a people as a whole, and not on the basis of factional, religious, communal or ethnic criteria. Secondly, the reality is that the Turkish Cypriots cannot exercise such a right on an occupied part of the territory of Cyprus, on which they have all along been but a small minority of 18 per cent, while the large majority of 82 per cent, as already explained, have only recently been expelled and supplanted by Turks from Anatolia and the Turkish military occupying forces.

32. The so-called referendum for a new "constitution" of the secessionist self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was held in the occupied territory of the Republic on 5 May 1985, and the so-called Presidential elections on 9 June. It is obvious from what we have stated above that these new illegalities, carried out on the notion of a "Turkish Cypriot people", constitute a mockery of all democratic principles and a contempt of all internationally recognized concepts of human rights. The principle of self-determination cannot be interpreted in such a way as to impair the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of any State.

33. But beyond these violations of principles, the results of the so-called referendum established beyond any doubt that without the "votes" of the settlers imported by the occupying Power from Turkey in order to change the demographic character of the country and to adulterate the will of the Turkish Cypriot community, a majority in favour of the new "constitution" would not have been secured.

34. The assessment is also reflected and confirmed by Turkish Cypriot newspapers and by statements of Turkish Cypriot leaders. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Ortam* of 7 May wrote, for instance, that "without the settlers, the constitution would have been rejected". *Yeniduzen* of 6 May adds that, according to voting results from villages, the Turkish mainlanders have played an important role in the "referendum", whereas in the many villages where the Turkish Cypriots live the "no" voters were in the majority.

35. Moreover, on 9 May in an article in *Yeniduzen*, the leader of the Republican Turkish Party, Mr. Ozgur, said, *inter alia*, that "there is a sham democracy in the occupied areas". To visiting foreigners, he continued, "it has been said that there are no political prisoners, but while artificial impressions continue, citizens have been tortured in prisons, strikers have been banned and partisanship has run havoc". Mr. Ozgur added that the people did not say "yes" to this "constitution". He said the "constitution" went into force with the votes of those who are not Cypriots, just as the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktaş, was elected in 1981 with the votes of those who were not Cypriots. "We are unable to be the masters of our own home", he concluded.

36. Apart from the above serious *faits accomplis*, the Turkish side resorted recently to a number of misleading and provocative statements. These statements reveal, *inter alia*, that there is a serious retrogression from the past positions of the Turkish side, despite the fact that essentially these positions were to a great extent uncompromising and that now conditions are imposed for a dialogue and solution.

37. For almost 11 years the people of Cyprus have been the anguished victims of a ruthless Turkish policy of invasion, aggression, military occupation, expulsion, uprooting, intervention, attempts at secession and massive violation of human rights. For almost 11 years we have come before this body and other international forums to seek justice and vindication for the unacceptable injustices and crimes perpetrated against our country and our people. On the other hand, for almost 11 years the drama of the enclaved Greek Cypriots continues and their number is decreasing, due certainly to the refusal of the Turkish side to honour commitments undertaken with regard to their living conditions.

38. The international community vindicated our cause by adopting a host of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning Turkey and the illegalities it committed. Those resolutions demand, *inter alia*, the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus and the return of all refugees to their homes in safety. They deplore all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of the country by the importation of Anatolian settlers into the occupied areas or that promote *faits accomplis*. They express full support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. Security Council resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 deplored the declaration of the purposed secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, considered such declaration legally invalid and called for its withdrawal. Security Council resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 condemned all subsequent secessionist actions and also declared them illegal and invalid and called for their immediate withdrawal.

39. Numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions also call for intercommunal negotiations between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to reach an agreed solution to the internal aspect of the problem of Cyprus. Not only has the Government of Turkey done nothing to implement the provisions of those resolutions, it is violating them outright.

40. With regard even to the provisions for negotiations, Turkey pays lip-service to them and uses them as a means of mollifying the international community anxiously awaiting progress on the question of Cyprus, which has been described as one of the major international problems. By its deeds and policies Turkey seeks to destroy the agreed pattern for a solution based upon United Nations resolutions and on the high-level agreements of 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*], thus making any hope for negotiations devoid of any substance and meaning, for nothing would be left to negotiate short of asking the Government of Cyprus to accept the participation and dismemberment of the Republic of Cyprus. The tragedy of Cyprus consists of, one, the unchecked and ongoing Turkish aggression and occupation and, two, the non-implementation by Turkey of the mandatory resolutions of this body and its systematic undermining of the negotiating process through *faits accomplis* aimed at consolidating its stranglehold over its victim, the Republic of Cyprus and its people.

41. Turkey's rejection, *in toto*, of all United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus and its contemptuous disregard of the expressed will of the international community should be a matter for primary and grave concern to the Security Council. Determined and concerted action by the Council in accordance with the Charter remains an imperative requirement and an historic duty if justice is really to prevail. My Government reserves the right to come before the Security Council and demand that effective measures be taken for the implementation of those resolutions.

42. The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, has stated on numerous occasions that the Government of Cyprus is more anxious than anyone else to see a negotiated settlement of the problem of Cyprus. But, as he added, equal emphasis should also be placed on the fairness and viability of that solution. It would be absurd for anyone to suggest that we are not in a hurry to reach a just and lasting settlement of the question. We can only stand to gain from such a solution. The people of Cyprus as a whole stand to benefit from an end to the 11-year military occupation of part of our national territories; we stand to gain from an end to the daily drama of the 200,000 of our compatriots who have been rendered destitute refugees in their own country. A just solution will enable the people of Cyprus to enjoy once again the blessings of co-operation and of unimpeded freedom to move and to reside all over our little country. Who can discount the relief of the families of the hundreds of missing persons once the fate of their loved ones is traced and accounted for?

43. The total withdrawal of the foreign troops of occupation forms the backbone of the United Nations resolutions and is a *sine qua non* for any viable and just solution. On the issue of the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus, the President of the Republic said the following on 25 May 1985:

> "The first and primary demand, for which the international community has undertaken obligations and commitments, is the withdrawal of all occupation troops. We have repeatedly declared that there cannot be a solution of the Cyprus problem, and we shall not sign a solution, without the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Cyprus and all settlers. We are not chauvinists or extremists; these are the elementary prerequisites in order to secure peace, tranquillity, security, calm, freedom and the human rights of all citizens."

44. A demilitarized Cyprus as proposed by my President, without armies of occupation and barbed wire, will bring forth again, stronger and warmer, the age-old, peaceful and amicable coexistence of the people of Cyprus now divided by artificially imposed barriers. Will Cyprus again become an island of peace and harmony? Will its people—all its people: Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites, Latins—be allowed to live peacefully together and enjoy the fruits of common country and destiny, as it is their burning desire and longing to do? The answer rests squarely on the shoulders of the members of the Security Council.

45. I wish that Ankara's record was such that it would allow me to believe that it would share these aspirations of our people for peace, co-operation and happiness in a Federal Republic of Cyprus, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements.

46. The Government of Cyprus has categorically stated—and we repeat now—its total and unreserved support for the commendable efforts of the Secretary-General within the framework of his personal initiative and in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We have always co-operated fully with the Secretary-General in order to promote a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. In an effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, we made, throughout the years following the invasion, a series of significant concessions. At this moment, we again co-operate fully with the Secretary-General so that his initiative will be successful. As can be seen in paragraph 5 of Addendum 1 of the Secretary-General's report [*S/17227/Add.1*], our reply to the Secretary-General is affirmative.

47. We maintain our readiness and dedication to achieving a solution in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. We have full trust in the Secretary-General and firmly believe that his statesmanship, his vision and his dedication to his mission, as well as his affinity to Cyprus, make him a unique personality for achieving the long-expected, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem.

48. We are ready. Is the Turkish side ready as well? For that is the crux of the matter. Let us work together to make Cyprus the little paradise it was meant to be, by rebuilding the bridges of co-operation that were blown up by foreign interference and chauvinistic forces of division.

49. Let us here and now solemnly pledge our earnest commitment to abide in word and deed by the provisions of these resolutions and the high-level agreements. Let us listen even at this late hour to the agony of the anguished people of Cyprus who cry out for peace with justice and freedom. Let us look history squarely in the face and say we have done what was expected of us. Only then will Cyprus again be an island of peace and harmony, contributing to the linking in co-operation of the three continents that surround it.

50. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

51. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I should like to thank you, and through you the other members of the Council, for acquiescing to my request to participate in the Council's debate on the renewal of the UNFICYP mandate.

52. May I take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. It gives me particular pleasure to see Mr. Mahabir, the Foreign Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, presiding at this meeting. I should also like to express my appreciation for the way in which the representative of Trinidad and Tobago conducted the consultations which led to the present resolution. On this occasion, I should also like to pay tribute to the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Mr. Savetsila, and the representative of Thailand, Mr. Kasemsri, who guided the Council's work last month, during a particularly delicate phase, in an exemplary manner.

53. The Greek Government fully supports the resolution that has just been adopted by the Council extending the mandate of UNFICYP for six more months. In supporting this resolution we took note of the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the only legitimate spokesman of the sovereignty of the Republic, has already given its consent. We consider that it is, unfortunately, imperative that the Force remain further in Cyprus in its present strength. The Force has indeed become a very important component of a highly delicate balance consisting of a wide spectrum of factors. Without the Force, I am afraid that this balance might be gravely disturbed, to the detriment of peace in the region. UNFICYP is carring out its difficult task in a very effective manner. I should like to express in this respect our appreciation to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of the Force, as well as to Mr. Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Our particular thanks are also addressed to all the friendly countries which have been contributing troops and funds for many years in excess of those originally foreseen, thus making possible the continued existence of UNFICYP.

54. I will not at this juncture address the substance of the Cyprus question. The facts are well known and the members of the Security Council are fully aware of the prevailing situation and its background. Besides, the representative of the Republic of Cyprus has just given us a lucid account of the situation on the island.

55. I would, however, be remiss if I did not stress in this context the positive attitude of the Cyprus Government with regard to the initiative of the Secretary-General. Indeed, in its desire to contribute to a climate conducive to the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General, the Government of Cyprus has displayed great political restraint and statesmanship. Not only did it accept, with onerous sacrifices, all of the proposals of the Secretary-General, it also did not bring to the Council the recent violations of the sovereignty of the Republic by the Turkish side. I am referring to the promulgation and carrying out of so-called referendums, elections, and so forth. They are violations that run counter to and defy the relevant United Nations resolutions and the unequivocally and repeatedly stated position of the totality of the nations of the Organization—with the exception of Turkey.

56. My Government has consistently and sincerely, from the very beginning, supported the recent initiative of the Secretary-General, whereas others have only paid lip-service to it while at the same time undermining its substance with their actions. My Government earnestly hopes that the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General will finally succeed and bear fruit.

I take this opportunity to pay a tribute once again to the Secretary-General for the dedication and diplomatic stamina he displays in discharging his difficult and delicate mission of good offices.

57. It is the sincere wish of my Government that a solution to the Cyprus question be found soon—a viable solution that will secure the territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, based on justice, internationally accepted democratic principles and respect for human rights; a solution which will entail, upon agreement, the withdrawal of all occupation troops. In the view of my Government any solution would be totally incompatible with the presence of any troops of occupation on the island or any other foreign troops in the Republic.

58. I further earnestly wish that the Turkish side will respond positively to the proposals of the Secretary-General, so that in the months to come, we shall be able to witness progress on the question of Cyprus for the benefit of all its people and peace in the area.

59. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Özer Koray, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. KORAY: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Security Council for affording me this opportunity to speak and put the views and the position of the Turkish Cypriot side on the matter before this body and on the various aspects of the Cyprus problem. The right of the Turkish Cypriot side to speak and be heard becomes all the more indispensable when—as was predictably demonstrated once again by the previous two speakers—the world is being subjected to a constant barrage of prevarications and distortions on the problem of Cyprus.

61. Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Greek Cypriot side still pretends to be the injured party and audaciously tries to divert the Council's attention from what has now come to be the crux of the Cyprus problem. That crux is the fact, conclusively proven only six months ago, that the Greek Cypriot side, led by Mr. Kyprianou, does not want a solution to the Cyprus problem, that solution, of course, being on the basis of a bicommunal, bi-zonal Federal Republic of Cyprus, as envisaged by the draft agreement painstakingly prepared through the efforts of the Secretary-General after five months of ardous negotiations and presented to the two sides for conclusion on 17 January 1985.

62. By his prompt and total rejection of the draft agreement, in the negotiation of which he himself had taken part, Mr. Kyprianou, egged on by his certain mentor, was sending a clear message to all concerned that he was intent on hanging on to the seat of government which his predecessor had usurped in 1963 and passed on to him as a legacy. Since the Greek Cypriot side alone seems to have forgotten the past, allow me to refresh their memory and, in doing so, I hope, to show the present Greek Cypriot leadership that no amount of calumny can be a viable substitute for the facts which unfolded before the eyes of the whole world only a short while ago in New York. A brief review of the developments of the recent past should adequately serve the purpose.

63. In the exercise of his mission of good offices, the Secretary-General presented to the two sides, at Vienna on 6 and 7 August 1984, what he called working points, as an indivisible, integrated whole aimed at reaching a comprehensive package settlement of the Cyprus problem. Both sides, having agreed to enter into negotiations on the basis of the working points, were invited to New York to engage in proximity talks.

64. The Turkish Cypriot side, right from the start, gave the Secretary-General full and unstinting support in his efforts to bring about a just and lasting solution in the island within the framework of the Vienna working points, which guaranteed, *inter alia*, the equal political status of the two communities, which is a prerequisite in any federation and which was considered as such by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar.

65. The first and second rounds of proximity talks, held in New York in September and October respectively, helped towards developing the Vienna working points into a draft agreement.

66. It should be noted here that the attitude and posture of the Greek Cypriot delegation, headed by Mr. Kyprianou, had already begun to reveal its real intentions about the whole exercise, which was in marked contrast to the Turkish Cypriot delegation's positive and forthcoming attitude.

67. At the end of the first round of talks, words like "thorough" and "businesslike" were used by the Secretary-General to describe the proceedings. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktaş, in his turn, expressed optimism in his own statement. Mr. Kyprianou, however, true to his vacillating attitude, stood alone in his pessimism and in his unwarranted attack on the Turkish Cypriot side. Mr. Kyprianou's former Foreign Minister, Mr. Rolandis, however, issued a statement in Nicosia on 25 September, accusing Mr. Kyprianou of foot-dragging.

68. At the end of the second round, the Secretary-General issued a statement indicating that the parties had "agreed to hold a final round of high-level proximity talks", beginning on 26 November. The Secretary-General, stressing the finality of the third round, requested both sides to come to the final round not with their bargaining positions but with their final positions, in order to be able to take major political decisions.

69. Heeding the call of the Secretary-General, the Turkish Cypriot side took crucial political decisions

and mapped out its final positions, which included very important sacrifices and concessions. It was in that conciliatory spirit that Mr. Denktaş accepted *in toto* and without reservations the draft agreement put forward by the Secretary-General. That was on 27 November, the second day of the third round of talks. Indeed, this extremely forthcoming stance by the Turkish Cypriot leadership was duly hailed unanimously by the world media as providing hope for a breakthrough.

70. Even the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou, known for his systematic opposition to peaceful negotiations, could not deny the constructive approach of President Denktaş. According to the Athens News Agency's report of 2 January 1985, Mr. Papandreou said that "the Turkish Cypriot side had undoubtedly made significant steps in the direction of a viable and just settlement of the Cyprus problem".

71. Faced with the moment of decision and truth, Mr. Kyprianou was once again engulfed by his customary indecision and hesitation. He asked for, and got, a 10-day grace period for consultations in Nicosia and Athens.

72. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 50 of his report to the Security Council of 12 December 1984 [*S/16858*], summarized the important developments of this final round, stating that the Turkish side had conveyed to him its favourable reaction to all elements of his presentation, and that, in the course of further discussions, he had received from the Turkish Cypriot delegation understandings that were helpful in further narrowing the gap. By 12 December it was the Secretary-General's assessment that the documentation for a draft agreement could be submitted to the joint high-level meeting. He expected that the interlocutors would, at the high-level meeting, conclude an agreement containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution of the problem, aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus.

73. Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council six months ago, on 14 December 1984, President Denktaş stated in the clearest terms his stand *vis-à-vis* the Secretary-General's package. He said at that time:

> "We attended all three stages with good will and with an ardent desire to see the end of the artificially created Cyprus problem, which has threatened my people for two decades and which continues to threaten them. We helped the Secretary-General at all stages and accepted his draft agreement for a comprehensive settlement of the problem.
>
> "As the Secretary-General underlined on many occasions and as has also been explicitly and clearly specified and stipulated in the text itself, the draft agreement constitutes, with all its components, an integrated whole. By its nature, this draft agreement is not open and does not allow for the introduction of reservations of any kind. With good will, I am sure the draft agreement can be concluded and sent to the working groups and can work for the peace of Cyprus." [*See 2565th meeting, paras. 64 and 65.*]

74. Both the Secretary-General and President Denktaş underlined their adherence to and acceptance of the nature of the draft agreement as an integrated whole. Their positions were clear as to the task which lay ahead, to be tackled at the summit meeting. What remained to be done at the joint high-level meeting was to agree on three dates which had been left blank, to decide on setting up a working group or groups which could elaborate the details of the agreement and to endorse, as an integrated whole, the draft agreement. In order words, the summit of 17 January 1985 was to conclude the agreement negotiated during the proximity talks, which had lasted for five months.

75. However, Mr. Kyprianou disagreed with that viewpoint, a disagreement which, as we have all witnessed, led to the collapse of the joint high-level meeting.

76. On the morning of 17 January, the very first meeting of the summit, the Secretary-General reiterated to the two leaders that the meeting was to conclude an agreement aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus. Mr. Denktaş, concurring, stated that the adoption of the agreement "will mark the beginning of a new era in the relations between our two peoples, and we wholeheartedly hope it will lead to the early establishment of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, which will be a legacy to leave to future generations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots".

77. Mr. Kyprianou, however, as of the very first meeting on the morning of 17 January, raised fundamental objections to each and every paragraph of the draft agreement. He denied even the existence of such an agreement. He questioned basic concepts, such as the equal political status of the two communities and bizonality, which were already in the Vienna working points and which were agreed upon until then. He was not prepared to fill in the blank dates and agree to the establishment of working groups. He rejected the Turkish guarantee and opposed the establishment of a transitional federal Government. While Mr. Kyprianou was carrying on with his antics inside, his spokesman, Mr. Christofides, was calling the draft agreement a ghost document outside.

78. That seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Greek Cypriot side, which was tantamount to the total rejection of the draft agreement, was the sole reason for the failure of the summit, and it did not go unnoticed by the world press. The Associated Press reported on 21 January:

> "Pérez de Cuéllar's staff was described as baffled by what was seen here as a marked 'change in tone' on Kyprianou's part since the indirect talks ...

" 'The real story is what changed the Greek Cypriot view' the official said. 'The answer may be in Nicosia or it may be in Athens.' "

The Washington Post wrote on 21 January:

"U.N. and Western officials said afterwards that one motive for Kyprianou's stand was that the Athens government had discouraged an agreement on Cyprus."

79. Such perceptive observations as to the responsibility of Mr. Kyprianou and Athens can be endlessly extended. The fact of the matter and the crux of the problem is that Mr. Kyprianou and his certain mentor did not then, and do not now, want a settlement in Cyprus which envisages guaranteeing the equal political status of the two communities, embodies the basic principles of bi-communality and bi-zonality and ensures the continuation of the Turkish guarantee, which is indispensable for the Turkish Cypriot side. Mr. Kyprianou admitted as much in a statement he gave to the Tanjug press agency of Yugoslavia, which was reported by the Greek Cypriot press on 11 February. In that statement Mr. Kyprianou justified his rejection of the draft agremeent by pointing out that his acceptance would have diminished and weakened the Greek Cypriot propaganda.

80. For his unscrupulous wrecking of the summit Mr. Kyprianou was roundly condemned, not only abroad, but in south Cyprus as well. The Greek Cypriot press and the leaders of the two major Greek Cypriot political parties, mustering 67 per cent of the Greek Cypriot votes and 23 of the 35 seats of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, openly blamed Mr. Kyprianou for torpedoing the summit. Again examples attesting to this fact abound, and I am sure all members are aware of them. Suffice it to say that the climax of this round condemnation of Mr. Kyprianou by an overwhelming majority of his people came with the adoption on 22 February of a resolution by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives censuring Mr. Kyprianou for his handling of the Cyprus problem and calling on him to abide by the views of the majority or proclaim early presidential elections in the Greek Cypriot zone.

81. Calls and demonstrations for Mr. Kyprianou's resignation still continue unabated. The conclusion of the AKEL Secretary-General, Mr. Papaioannou, clearly expressed in his statement during the censure debate, applies to most of the Greek Cypriots. This was his conclusion:

"Kyprianou never adopted the basis of federation which was agreed upon by Makarios and Denktaş, and Kyprianou never exerted any effort for the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a federation. Kyprianou never respected the summit agreements."

I need not stress that we have no problems with that conclusion.

82. In spite of what I have just said, and of the internationally acknowledged fact that it was Mr. Kyprianou who was solely responsible for the breakdown of the January summit and the squandering of a historic opportunity for a solution in Cyprus, the temptation, as we have just witnessed, to the Greek Cypriot side to push ahead with its international campaign of deceitful propaganda and diversionary tactics appears to be too difficult to resist.

83. At a time when the internal political climate on the Greek Cypriot side is, to say the least, in a state of confusion and uncertainty, it is difficult to understand why the Greek Cypriot Administration, instead of trying to put its own house in order, tries to raise questions about the internal democratic processes that are taking place on the Turkish Cypriot side. Those are purely internal matters for the Turkish Cypriot people, who are in the process of electing the organs and the people who will be authorized and mandated to represent them in all matters of State, including the negotiations aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Elections in Cyprus were always held separately by the two communities, and there never was any question of the two communities casting ballots in the same election. That has always been the order of things in Cyprus.

84. If the Greek Cypriot Administration, which is devoid of any legality or legitimacy and to which the Turkish people of Cyprus owe no allegiance, continues to exploit and misrepresent the democratic processes in northern Cyprus, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be fully justified in doubting whether there is anyone on the Greek Cypriot side with the full mandate of the Greek Cypriot people to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots.

85. Only the other day that Administration, in line with its perennial, arrogant and unfeeling policy towards the Turkish Cypriot people, tried to prevent the international media from covering the presidential elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We hope that the frequency of such actions, which trample upon the principle of freedom of the press, will be correctly evaluated by world public opinion and be seen as an indication of lack of good will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side.

86. I categorically reject all the allegations of the Greek Cypriot side that the Turkish Cypriot side is implanting settlers from Turkey in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and I draw the Council's attention to my letter dated 12 June 1985 to the Secretary-General [*S/17261, annex*].

87. We have studied with the utmost care the contents of the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General pertaining to his good offices and observations

[*S/17227/Add.1*]. In paragraph 3, he refers to his efforts to overcome "the difficulties which had arisen during the January meeting". As stated earlier, everybody knows that those difficulties stemmed from the Greek Cypriot side. The same paragraph refers also to a "single consolidated draft agreement". I have to underline the following points in this regard.

88. First, the draft agreement of 27 November presented at the New York summit, which constituted, in all its aspects, an integrated whole and which the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted *in toto*, could not be changed without the consent and agreement of the Turkish Cypriot side. This vital and central aspect of the Secretary-General's approach and of the draft agreement had been stressed in the Secretary-General's previous reports of 12 December 1984 [*S/16858 and Add.1*] and 2 February 1985 [*ibid., Add.2*].

89. However, it was ascertained as a result of the preliminary study made by the Turkish Cypriot side that the new text, as compared with the original documentation, contained substantial differences as regards both the substance and the procedure to be followed. These differences run counter to the Secretary-General's "integrated whole" approach. The Turkish Cypriot side has already informed the Secretary-General that it will communicate to him its views and proposals as regards the substantial differences after the elections on 23 June.

90. Furthermore, it is misleading to speak of a "single consolidated text" since, as we understand it, it does not cover all of the substantial elements of the original documentation, which constituted an integrated whole.

91. Besides, the origin and status of certain newly introduced elements, as well as their relationship to the new text, remain ambiguous for us.

92. Paragraph 3 refers to contacts with the two sides and may lead to the impression that, following the collapse of the January summit, the exercise of consolidating the texts has been initiated and carried out with the consent of the two sides. This would be misleading, since the Turkish Cypriot side has not given its consent to such an exercise, which has been carried out through contacts and consultations with the Greek Cypriot side only, in mid-March and early April, as stated in paragraph 4. The Turkish Cypriot side was informed of the conclusions of these contacts for the first time in mid-April.

93. With regard to paragraph 5, I have the following observations. First of all, the problem cannot be presented as a simple phenomenon, as if the Greek Cypriot leader has now accepted the documentation he rejected in January. Mr. Kyprianou indulged in interpretations in January which would invalidate any subsequent "affirmative reply" on the same basis. Furthermore, his public statements following this reportedly affirmative reply clearly reveal that he continues to reject the basic principles and concepts contained in the documentation of 27 November. It is all too clear that not a single word of the Greek Cypriot leader can be taken at its face value either by the Turkish Cypriots or by the elected majority of Greek Cypriots. What Mr. Kyprianou has actually accepted, and how and to what extent, and whether he still insists on his previous interpretations constitute a big mystery. As is well known, Mr. Kyprianou has categorically rejected or tried to water down all basic principles and concepts upon which the draft agreement was built and presented as an integrated whole by the Secretary-General at the 17 January summit.

94. Since it is now reported in paragraph 8 that "the obstacles which had stood in the way of the acceptance of the documentation by the Greek Cypriot side" have been removed, it is imperative for the Turkish Cypriot side to be informed whether Mr. Kyprianou now accepts the basic concepts and principles embodied in the original documentation, such as equal political status of the two sides, bi-zonality, international guarantees, security and the regulation of the three freedoms in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Denktaş-Makarios agreement, or whether he continues to reject these, as he did at the January summit. The Turkish Cypriot side should know whether Mr. Kyprianou now accepts the documentation of 27 November as it stood.

95. Statements by Mr. Kyprianou since the January summit demonstrate that he has not changed his previous position on these basic concepts and principles. Particularly since mid-April, he has availed himself of all opportunities to reaffirm that he did not take into account the legitimate security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, that he did not accept the concept of bi-zonality and that he had no other preoccupations than serving the unilateral and discriminating interests of Hellenism in Cyprus. We hope the Greek Cypriot leader can explain first to his community, then to the Turkish Cypriots, his genuine position on these points.

96. The Turkish Cypriot side, after going through the experience of the summit meeting in January, has indicated to the Secretary-General on more than one occasion that it feels the strong need for a renewed mandate in order to enable its elected organs to take up all the substantive questions with the Secretary-General. In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot side has officially reconfirmed its constructive position on a bi-zonal federal solution.

97. As regards the comments of the spokesman of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 6, I should like to point out that these are entirely irrelevant, and I must say they cast a shadow on the basis of the mission of good offices. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus came into being in November 1983 as a manifestation of the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people, under circumstances known to us all. It is as legitimate an entity as the Greek Cypriot

Administration in the south, only more so. Nobody has any right to pass judgement on the democratic and peaceful internal developments of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We regret to see such a remark find its way into the report of the Secretary-General.

98. As to paragraph 7 of the addendum, we should like to state that the appointment of a third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus was unduly delayed by the foot-dragging tactics of the Greek Cypriot side with a view to exploiting this humanitarian issue in international forums. We very much hope that the Greek Cypriot side will finally let the Committee carry on with its well-defined humanitarian task.

99. The resolution adopted by the Council contains elements that are unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side.

100. The resolution refers to an illegal entity as the Government of Cyprus, which is abhorrent to us. Need we say that that reference is devoid of any constitutional, legal or moral basis? The bicommunal, legitimate Government of Cyprus was destroyed by force in 1963 by its Greek Cypriot wing and ceased to exist from then on. The entity which replaced it is a usurping, masquerading entity to which no allegiance is owed by the Turkish Cypriot side.

101. In the fourth preambular paragraph a reference is made to "other relevant resolutions". Since the Turkish Cypriot side has either rejected *in toto*, or accepted subject to reservations, the resolutions in question, this reference too is unacceptable to it.

102. In paragraph 3 a reference is made to the "present mandate". We have to stress that the mandate in question is not compatible with the radically changed conditions.

103. Notwithstanding its unavoidable rejection *in toto* of the present resolution, the Turkish Cypriot side is nevertheless prepared to accept the presence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in December 1984 [*see 2565th meeting, para. 57*]. Thus our position continues to be that the principles, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

104. Lastly, I should like to reiterate our support for the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975), and, as I have stressed in the foregoing, the Turkish Cypriot side will be ready to contact the Secretary-General within the context of his mission of good offices after the elections on 23 June.

105. At this juncture I think it would be proper for me to point out a fact of which I am sure all members of the Council are aware. The resolution that has just been adopted differs from the draft that was shown to us a few days ago as an interested party. We were informed of the change only this morning. I am also sure that all members of the Council know which party instigated the deletion of the part to which I am referring from the original draft and that they will form their own conclusions.

106. Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity, first of all, to express our profound thanks for the efforts of the Secretary-General within the context of his mission of good offices. We are grateful to him. Our sincere thanks and appreciation go to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Holger, for the manner in which he has been carrying out his duties. Our thanks go also to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General Greindl, and the men under his command, for the way in which they have been carrying out their duties. We thank also all the members of the United Nations Secretariat who are dealing with the question of Cyprus. To the new third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, Mr. Wurth, we convey our wishes for success.

107. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

108. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I had the pleasure of congratulating you during a previous meeting of the Council. We are gratified to see you presiding over this meeting of the Council also. I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for granting me this opportunity of making a statement.

109. It has been six months since the Council met for the extension of UNFICYP's mandate. On that occasion [*2565th meeting*], the Council had before it the Secretary-General's periodic report of 12 December 1984 [*S/16858 and Add.1*], which described the outcome of the proximity talks during the preceding five months, leading to his call for a joint high-level meeting on 17 January 1985. It was the expressed expectation of the Secretary-General that an agreement containing the necessary elements for a comprehensive solution aimed at establishing a Federal Republic of Cyprus would be concluded at that meeting. This was also the expectation of the Turkish side and indeed of the international public, which, both before and after the summit meeting, recognized the crucial nature of the political decisions taken by the Turkish Cypriot authorities by accepting in full, on 27 November 1984, the draft agreement worked out by the Secretary-General in the proximity talks.

110. At the opening of the summit meeting on 17 January the Secretary-General underlined the significance of the new stage that had been reached in the search for a comprehensive solution in Cyprus. He stated:

> "If you are determined to reach an agreement, a unique chance now exists. If the moment is lost, I am

sure you will agree, it may not readily recur." [*See S/16858/Add.2, annex I.*]

111. These expectations were shattered when the Greek Cypriot leader refused to endorse the agreement and denied even its existence at the summit meeting. While the Turkish Cypriot side fully accepted the draft agreement, the Greek Cypriot side could not go beyond regarding the documentation as a basis for negotiations only, which meant that it did not accept anything in reality and was not ready or willing to enter into reciprocal commitments with the Turkish Cypriot side.

112. I do not believe it is necessary to dwell at length on the grave responsibility of the Greek Cypriot leader in deliberately wasting an historic opportunity for conciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus last January. The international public has already passed a clear judgement in this regard. For those who did not wish to apportion responsibility in January, the developments during the following five months must have been revealing. They only had to look at the internal crisis and turmoil in the Greek Cypriot side to draw their conclusions. We have witnessed how the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives censured Mr. Kyprianou's actions in New York and demanded his resignation.

113. In view of all this, I had difficulty in believing what I heard when Mr. Moushoutas blamed President Denktaş for the failure of the January meeting. He should have at least read the latest report of the Secretary-General, which says:

> "As I informed the Council in my report of 2 February [*S/16858/Add.2*], the Turkish Cypriot side stated at that meeting that it accepted the draft agreement as contained in the documentation which I had presented" [*see S/17227/Add.1, para. 2*].

The Secretary-General further says:

> "My approach since January has taken into account the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had agreed to the documentation" [*ibid., para. 8*].

So what is unconditional acceptance for everybody else, including the Secretary-General, is rejection for Mr. Moushoutas. By this twisted logic, President Denktaş will have to display real intransigence next time to earn the appreciation of the Greek Cypriots.

114. Mr. Moushoutas has also made some other bizarre assertions. In one of them he has portrayed the Turkish Cypriots as martyrs because of the presence of Turkish troops. The Turkish Cypriots, who believe that the Turkish troops came to save them from the onslaught and the oppression of the Greek Cypriots, will, I am afraid, not be touched by this solicitude.

115. We have heard before and we have heard today once again unwarranted allegations against the democratic process that is at work in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In his letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 17 May 1985 [*S/17198, annex*] the Turkish Cypriot Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence drew attention to the contradictions in the Greek Cypriot attitude *vis-à-vis* the political developments in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is appropriately underlined in this letter that the Greek Cypriot Administration is indeed the least eligible institution to question the legality of others, both with its past record and present standing.

116. One point should be extremely clear: whatever rights exist in south Cyprus for the Greek Cypriots, the same rights exist in full in the north for the Turkish Cypriots. On no account are the Turkish Cypriot rights any less than those of the Greek Cypriots. This fact should be well understood, since it is the heart of the whole question of Cyprus. Any other approach closes the door to a federation which must rest on the political equality of the two peoples in the island.

117. The Greek Cypriots never had and still do not have any constitutional, legal or legitimate right whatsoever to claim to represent the Turkish Cypriot people and hence the whole of Cyprus. In the absence of a joint federal government, it is the inalienable right of the Turkish Cypriot people to be represented only by the authorities and organs elected freely by themselves. They cannot be expected to live in a political vacuum.

118. I wish to place on record before the Security Council our appreciation for the way in which the Turkish Cypriot people have exercised their natural right to organize their political and legal life through popular mandate. Following the constitutional referendum on 5 May 1985, presidential elections were held on 9 June. The process of electing the people who will be authorized to represent the Turkish Cypriots in all matters, including the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem, will be completed with the holding of general elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 23 June.

119. We wish to commend the official policy of the Turkish Cypriot side of leaving the door open to a bizonal federal solution to be negotiated freely between the two sides in the island. The Constituent Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 12 March 1985, while adopting the new draft constitution, passed a resolution stating that the Constitution it has approved does not hinder the establishment of a partnership within the framework of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federation. The commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side to such a solution has been stressed on numerous occasions at the highest level.

120. In contrast to these developments with regard to the Turkish Cypriot side, the record of the Greek Cypriot Administration during the past six months has indeed been far from giving any hope for conciliation between the two peoples of Cyprus. The Greek Cyp-

riots disagree among themselves, first of all, on how to run their political life and, secondly, on what sort of a solution they should seek.

121. Naturally, the Turkish side has been watching very closely the exchanges between the Greek Cypriot leader and the Greek Cypriot political parties which oppose his policies. The Turkish Cypriots will certainly wish to know what sort of a solution the Greek Cypriot side intends to seek and which of the Greek Cypriot positions is to be taken seriously.

122. If we search for some positive signs, we have to acknowledge first the efforts of the Secretary-General within the framework of his mission of good offices, which my Government continues strongly to support. We recognize that his task has been difficult and trying, but we hope it will not remain unrewarded. With his deep knowledge of the realities of Cyprus, the Secretary-General has acted with dedication and remarkable patience and moderation. I wish to assure him of my Government's full confidence and support.

123. It is clear that the Turkish Cypriot authorities are positively and formally committed to the search for a genuine federation between the two peoples of the island. They will soon be ready, as stressed at the highest level, to pursue the peace talks with a renewed popular mandate.

124. The Turkish Government will continue to play its traditional role of moderation and will strive to facilitate the search for a bi-zonal federal solution in the island.

125. We have studied carefully the section of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the good offices mission [*S/17227/Add.1, sect. I*]. Mr. Koray has just expressed the views of his Government on the points contained in this section. I should like also to make a few comments on our part.

126. First, after the collapse of the high-level meeting in January, the problem is no longer simply to ensure a change of heart on the part of Mr. Kyprianou and obtain from him a delayed acceptance of the documentation. In refusing to accept this documentation in January, Mr. Kyprianou had interpreted the substantive points it contained in a manner which immediately invalidated and vitiated any expression of acceptance at a later stage. It is clear that what Mr. Kyprianou wants is to give the impression that he now agrees with the documentation while continuing to reject its fundamental concepts. The latest statements of Mr. Kyprianou have once more shown that he is very far from being reconciled to the concept of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federation.

127. Secondly, in agreeing to substantial concessions during the proximity talks, President Denktaş has acted on the assumption that the documentation submitted to the January meeting formed an integrated whole, as repeatedly stated by the Secretary-General. Therefore, after its rejection by Mr. Kyprianou, a new situation emerged in which both parties were free to reformulate their negotiating positions. The Secretary-General could of course endeavour to induce the two parties to reach an agreement on the same basis, but this would require new discussions with both parties to ascertain whether they agree to follow such a course of action. It could not be assumed automatically that the position of one of the parties remains immutable after the rejection of the package by the other party.

128. Thirdly, the statement contained in paragraph 3 of the section on good offices that the substance of the documentation has been preserved and that its various elements have been incorporated in a single consolidated draft agreement calls for some clarification. As Mr. Koray has pointed out, the text now presented does not encompass some of the substantial points contained in the documentation submitted in January. We understand that some additional elements to the draft agreement have been orally communicated to the parties, but their connection with the draft agreement remains undefined.

129. Fourthly, again as stated by Mr. Koray, to the extent that they cover the same points, the draft agreement now put forward presents numerous substantial and fundamental differences from the document submitted in January.

130. Fifthly, it is clear from the report of the Secretary-General that the new approach was first discussed with the Greek Cypriots and that the draft agreement was communicated to the Turkish Cypriot side only after the presumed agreement of the Greek Cypriots. Since, as I have stressed earlier, a new negotiating process had to be initiated because of the failure of the high-level meeting in January, consultations with both sides before finalizing the new document were imperative.

131. I wish also to refer to paragraph 6 of the same section. The statement referred to in this paragraph is totally irrelevant to the internal developments in Northern Cyprus. The referendum and the elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have not changed the nature of the Turkish Cypriot State proclaimed on 15 November 1983. We—Turkey—have the honour to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Other countries are free either to recognize or not to recognize this State, but they have no right to interfere in its internal affairs.

132. The statement of the spokesman places also in doubt the basis on which the mission of the good offices of the Secretary-General is conducted. The absolute prerequisite of that mission is that the two sides in Cyprus should be treated on a strict basis of equality as the political authorities representing the two peoples of the island. Any departure from this basis cannot be reconciled with the mission of good offices. Therefore, we regard the statement of the spokesman as unfortu-

nate. It would have been much more appropriate if the report of the Secretary-General had not referred to it.

133. Regarding the paragraphs containing the observations [*ibid., sect. II*], I will refrain from elaborating on these, because most of what I have already said applies also to them. I will only note that the Secretary-General expresses strong optimism for the future. There is nothing that would make us rejoice more than to see this optimism vindicated. He will have our full support in his future endeavours to revive the negotiations between the two sides on a basis and within a procedure which is acceptable to both sides.

134. Turning to the resolution just adopted by the Council, I wish to reaffirm our fundamental objections to its contents. As in the case of previous resolutions, it does not rest on a legally or politically sound or valid foundation and therefore does not enjoy the support of all directly interested parties. The false premises on which it is based constitute major obstacles on the way to a negotiated solution in Cyprus.

135. The resolution is once again based on a so-called authorization from a so-called governmental entity whose juridical and *de facto* existence, as an authority capable of representing and comprising the two peoples of Cyprus, has ceased since December 1963. It furthermore refers to resolutions, in the fourth preambular paragraph, which were never accepted by two of the directly interested parties and prolongs a mandate which fails to take into account the radical changes in the actual situation.

136. This resolution has been rejected in its entirety by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey cannot accept it for the same reasons. Taking into account the recommendation of the Secretary-General for the continued presence of UNFICYP, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has indicated its willingness to go along with the presence of this Force in Northern Cyprus and to continue to co-operate with it, subject exclusively to the decisions taken by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

137. As previously stated and reconfirmed at this meeting, the principles, scope, modalities and procedures for co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP can only be based on decisions taken by the Government of the Republic of Northern Cyprus alone. The Turkish Government wishes to reconfirm its complete agreement with this position. The contacts between the Turkish authorities in Cyprus and UNFICYP will continue to take place on the basis of the Turkish Cypriot declaration.

138. With regard to paragraph 2, I wish to confirm our continuing support for the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975) and to underline that the Turkish Cypriot side has indicated that it will enter into contacts with the Secretary-General within the context of his mission of good offices following the elections on 23 June.

139. In conclusion, I wish to thank the Secretary-General, to whom we are grateful for his good offices. I should like to express our appreciation to Major-General Guenther Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and his staff, as well as to Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, and to his colleagues, who all continue to enjoy the full confidence of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish authorities. I should like also to wish Mr. Paul Wurth well in his task as the third member of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot authorities had agreed to his appointment nearly six months ago. We hope that his contribution to the humanitarian work of the Committee will not meet with the same impediments which delayed his appointment.

140. Mr. HOGUE (Australia): It is an indication of the intractability of the problems of Cyprus that UNFICYP has now entered its twenty-first year of operation. The search for a durable solution of Cyprus's problems has been a continuing effort, and hopes for a settlement have been raised and dashed on more than one occasion. The Secretary-General's most recent endeavours have engendered an atmosphere of positive expectation, and the opportunity to bring lasting peace to Cyprus must not be allowed to slip out of reach.

141. Australia's interest in and concern for a peaceful settlement on that island is heightened by the presence in Australia of sizeable communities whose national origins lie in Greece, in Turkey and in Cyprus itself. Like all other Australians, they look forward to an early resolution of the island's problems.

142. It is the firm belief of my Government that this can be effected only through negotiation and dialogue. Australia supports Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) and the path towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus mapped out in those and previous Council resolutions. We are aware that treading that path involves difficult choices for all concerned, but we must take heart from the Secretary-General's view that there is a basis on which a just and lasting solution can be achieved.

143. We remain convinced that the efforts of the Secretary-General towards a negotiated settlement continue to present the best means of progress. The Secretary-General's report of 11 June 1985 on his mission of good offices calls for the support of the international community for the further diplomatic activity which is to take place. The Secretary-General's activities should be given this support. Indeed, in adopting its resolution today the Council has indicated its continuing support for the mission of good offices. The Australian Government appeals to all the parties to continue to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his endeavours. Equally, while these efforts continue, it is essential that no side

should take any action which would put them in jeopardy.

144. We note that both sides have demonstrated a great deal of good will in the negotiations on the future of Cyprus. Both, at one time or another, have agreed or reacted affirmatively to the Secretary-Genereal's proposals. The Secretary-General has noted that what is now required is good will and co-operation. It must surely be our common hope that all parties will display the statesmanship necessary to finalize an agreement.

145. In the view of my Government, UNFICYP continues to play a valuable peace-keeping and humanitarian role. Australia has actively participated in UNFICYP by maintaining a contingent of civilian policemen in the Force. That support will be maintained. Yet my Government can only be concerned at the growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account. The result of this deficit is that the costs borne by the troop-contributing countries have been met only until June 1978. The international community, time and again, has renewed the mandate of UNFICYP. In the interests of fairness, and in the exercise of shared responsibilities, it is clearly time for the members of that community to reflect on and react to the financial burdens this creates. There is clearly a need for a very substantial increase in voluntary contributions to the Account, as well as in the number of countries making contributions, and we urge action to make up the deficit.

146. Let me conclude by looking to the day when a negotiated settlement of the difficult problem of Cyprus is achieved. That day will be a notable one for the cause of international co-operation embodied in the organization, but its most significant result would be felt in a Cyprus whose people could all live in peace and stability. Our hope is that that is not far distant.

147. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak. I now call upon him.

148. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I was hoping that the new representative of Turkey and my new countryman—who is here under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure as an individual but speaks in reality for Turkey—would not come up with the same worn-out, faded and overstated argument about the legal standing of my Government, my President and my delegation. I was hoping that they would be original by saying that the position on my Government on this issue is very well known. I was wrong.

149. However, I will not spend my time in trying to argue the point he chose to belabour, since the Council, all countries and the United Nations and other world organizations recognize my Government. I will simply brush it aside as another Turkish argument coming from a country which for the past 11 years has been kneeling on the neck of a small, non-aligned country and, with a big-bully mentality, wishes to imagine that it has exterminated its victim. The universal recognition of the strong legal basis upon which the recognition of my Government and of my President is based dictates silence as reply to this Turkish argument and underlines Turkey's isolation from the international community.

150. We heard with amazement that the preliminary draft agreement had only three empty spaces to be filled in. It is not so. As I stated before, this document provides that the territorial aspect—a very important aspect—and the creation of working groups were to be discussed and agreed upon at the high-level meeting. The document is still confidential; I cannot possibly circulate it.

151. I highly appreciated the representative of Turkey's pointing out to me, in the report of the Secretary-General, the reference to acceptance by Mr. Denktaş, but I should like to draw his attention also to the fact that, according to the report, Mr. Denktaş accepted the draft agreement. In fact, it was a preliminary draft for a high-level agreement. For the draft to become an agreement there must be discussion and negotiations. That, Mr. Denktaş failed to do, and by refusing to discuss at all, he wrecked, in reality, the high-level meeting, as he intended to do.

152. The crux of the matter with regard to this high-level meeting is that the Turkish side and Mr. Denktaş were forced by an international outcry to make some concrete proposals towards a negotiated settlement, but under no circumstances were they then, or are they now, willing to negotiate on the withdrawal of the occupation troops and on adequate international guarantees.

153. Through misrepresentation of facts the Turkish side sought, and for a while at least, I must admit, succeeded, in creating misleading impressions as to Mr. Denktaş's actual conduct at the high-level meeting and his scheme of torpedoing the Secretary-General's efforts by adamantly refusing any discussion, even on matters that *expressio verbis* were supposed to be discussed and agreed at the meeting, while at the same time trying to transfer the responsibility for the failure of the meeting onto the President of Cyprus. I could not conceal from the Council the disappointment felt at the distorted and orchestrated picture given after the above high-level meeting in some quarters that the meeting failed because our side did not sign papers which contained blanks on vital issues which were specifically agreed to be constructively discussed, as the Secretary-General said, with a view to achieving understanding during the high-level meeting.

154. These misleading impressions skilfully created by Turkish propaganda are being reversed. One after the other, impartial observers increasingly recognize that the new series of illegal cessationist actions by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with the connivance and full support of Ankara, strongly attests to the insin-

cerity and bad faith on the Turkish side during the high-level meeting.

155. The Turkish side made a series of accusations against my Government and rushed to take the opportunity to exploit some differences of opinion existing in my country regarding the handling of the last high-level meeting on 17 January this year in New York. It was, of course, not unexpected that they would seek to capitalize on these differences.

156. I can only reply that in Cyprus there is, in law and in fact, genuine democracy, and that freedom of expression is an essential element of these genuine democratic traditions. As I stated before, I was not at all surprised by the exploitation of these differences. I was, however, impressed by the fact that the Turkish side knows in detail the positions of our leaders in Cyprus. That is admirable. Allow me to ask the representatives of the other side that standard question heard on a United States television news programme: does it know—or does the representative of Turkey know—where its party leaders are?

157. An eminent and objective authority such as the Secretary-General said on the subject of the outcome of the high-level meeting, "I think it would be unfair to blame the Greeks."

158. The current report of the Secretary-General, contained in document S/17227 and Add.1 and Add.2, is before the Council, and his views have more weight by far than those of the Turkish representative. Furthermore, the Secretary-General's statement that he expected a constructive discussion at the high-level meeting speaks for itself.

159. There was a denial as to the existence of settlers, thousands of settlers, in my little country. There are so many of them that they have even created a political party, and its leader, Mr. Ismail Tezer, who became a so-called minister in Denktaş's régime, in a press conference held on 22 December 1978 openly declared that the aims of his party were "to achieve the partition of Cyprus and its annexation to Turkey". On 17 August 1981 he admitted that "the settlers came to Cyprus with the approval of Turkey; that they represented an agricultural force; that almost all of them became citizens of the so-called Turkish Cypriot State and that their purpose was to stay forever in Cyprus".

160. In November 1979 Mr. Ozgur had this to say to a Mr. Curler, a member of the Denktaş régime, when the latter tried to hide the fact that settlers had been brought to Cyprus:

> "Do you think we come from the Moon? Do you try to deceive us too by saying things you say to the foreigners? Be a little bit serious when you are talking."

161. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Greece.

162. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I know how unpopular it is for one to ask to speak at 6.30 in the afternoon; it is the best way to earn the hostility of the entire Council, but I will be extremely brief. I have done so for the sake of truth and accuracy.

163. A reference was made to a statement of the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, who early in January stated that he was delighted to see that the Turkish side had made serious concessions.

164. The statement is true, but allow me to present it in favour of the Prime Minister, in the sense that it attests to his good faith. When the statement was made, Mr. Papandreou was genuinely convinced that the Turkish side had made serious concessions. He could never have conceived or imagined that Mr. Denktaş would later say, on 17 January: "I came not to negotiate"—as was clearly foreseen in the preliminary draft agreement— "but I came only to sign".

165. In his earnest desire to see an early solution to the problem, Mr. Papandreou had the political integrity to state and to recognize certain concessions he thought had really been made at the time, but after 17 January, he felt deceived and disillusioned, along with many others.

166. The PRESIDENT: I should like to place on record the appreciation of the presidency for the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General in pursuance of his good offices mandate in connection with the situation in Cyprus.

167. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization

168. The PRESIDENT: As we approach the end of the period covered in the annual report of the Security Council submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter, that is, from 16 June 1984 to 15 June 1985, the Council has agreed that I place on record that since 16 June 1984 the members of the Security Council have been engaged in consultations of the whole in connection with the issues raised in the annual reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization presented to the thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly, during which members have explored possible ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Council in accordance with the powers entrusted to it under the Charter. These consultations are being pursued informally. The Council presented an interim account of the progress of its work in the note by its President circulated as document S/16760 of 28 September 1984.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الامم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الامم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع انحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب الى : الامم المتحدة، قسم البيع في نيويورك او في جنيف .

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店查询或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-61439—March 1992—2,050